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Most observers have attributed the fiscal crises that have affected
many of our major urban centers in the last decade to a variety of mar-
ket shifts in the American economy. According to the prevailing expla-
nation, the decline in the fiscal capacity of cities was the inevitable
result of the decreased economic attractiveness of urban centers. Gov-
ernment policies and underlying political exigencies have been deemed
secondary causes, necessarily subordinate to market forces.
This article will show that the market explanation for fiscal strain is
incomplete and misleading. While market forces are important, govern-
ment policies, shaped by political as well as economic exigencies,' are
also important. The assertion that governmental actions are necessarily
subordinate to the market is an ideological one, designed to reduce the
realm of the political by definitional fiat.2
Part I of this article demonstrates that a series of federal policies
helped stimulate the exodus of capital and population that eroded the
revenue base of the older industrial cities. At the same time, other fed-
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1. This point of view, which casts state leaders as major historical actors in the shaping of
societies, stems from an eminent intellectual tradition that includes Max Weber, in addition
to such contemporary analysts as Stein Rokkan, Andrew Schonfeld, Charles Tilly, and
Charles Lindblom. The argument made in the present article about urban fiscal strain was
alluded to by Joseph Schumpeter when he asserted that in some historical periods the influ-
ence of state policies on economy and society "explains practically all the major features of
events, in most periods it explains a great deal and there are but a few periods when it ex-
plains nothing." Schumpeter, The Crisis ofthe Tax State, 4 INT'L. ECON. PAPERS 5, 7 (1954).
See C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977); S. ROKKAN, CITIZENS, ELECTIONS, PAR-
TIES (1970); A. SCHONFELD, MODERN CAPITALISM (1965); M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCI-
ETY (1968); Tilly, Western State-making and Theories of Political Transformation, in THE
FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 601 (C. Tilly ed. 1975).
In focusing on state policies and structures as causes of urban fiscal strain, this article per-
haps gives less than adequate attention to the complex processes which shape particular state
policies and state structures. Walton, writing of what he calls "the new urban social science,"
tries to suggest the scope of a complete examination of urban developments when he asserts
that the new urban social science "is concerned with the interplay of relations of production,
consumption, exchange, and the structure of power manifest in the state." J. Walton, Eco-
nomic Crisis and Urban Austerity: Issues of Research and Policy in the 1980's, at 4 (May
1980) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale Law &Policy Review). In other words, a
more complete explanation would treat economic and political developments in their com-
plex interactions.
2. Lukes makes this point nicely when he asserts that "[tlo talk of power implies that, if
the future facing social actors is not entirely open, it is not entirely closed either." S. LUKES,
ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY 7 (1977).
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eral policies were serving to fuel demands for compensatory social pro-
grams for urban residents. Together, these policies precipitated the
fiscal difficulties of the older industrial cities.
Part II shows that the American polity contains distinctive structural
features that help to account for the inconsistent federal policies which
generated urban fiscal strain. 3 These arrangements include the ten-
dency for investor-oriented and popularly-oriented policies to be located
at different levels of the federal system and in different agencies of a
fragmented governmental structure.
Finally, Part III addresses current policies and politics, postulating
that policy initiatives of the Reagan administration will shape both the
local politics and future prospects of urban fiscal strain. The impact of
the new policies is partly redistributional; there has been a dramatic
shift toward investor-oriented federal programs. More importantly,
however, the new policies are evidence of an effort by the administration
to alter the structural arrangements which permitted the emergence of
the politics underlying compensatory urban social welfare programs.
I. The Causes of Urban Fiscal Strai'n
A. The Federal Poh'cies Leading to Diminished Municipal Resources
The prevailing explanation of the fiscal strain that has bedeviled
many older large American cities emerges from the reports of Presiden-
tial commissions, the work of numerous academics, and the popular
press.4 It is easy to summarize. In response to lower taxes, lower labor
costs, and other locational incentives, investors abandoned the central
cities, first for the suburbs and later for the sunbelt and international
markets. Disinvestment inexorably eroded the sources of municipal rev-
enues; not only were there fewer employers and employees to be taxed,
but as prosperity waned, so did the sales and property values that were
the main sources of municipal revenue.
A decline in public revenues only generates fiscal strain, however,
3. For earlier discussions of the significance of structural arrangements for politics, see
generally F.F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR (1982); Friedland, Piven & Al-
ford, Political Conflict, Urban Structure, and the Fiscal Crisis, I INT'L. J. OF URB. & REGIONAL
RESEARCH 447 (1977); Piven & Friedland, Public Choice and Private Power, in PUBLIC SERVICE
PROVISION AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 390 (A. Kirby, P. Knox & S. Pinch eds. 1984).
4. For a series of well reasoned, scholarly examples of the prevailing perspective, see gener-
ally G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: METROPOLITAN DECLINE
AND INTER-REGIONAL JOB SHIFTS (1975). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR A NAT'L
AGENDA FOR THE EIGHTIES, URBAN AMERICA IN THE EIGHTIES (1980). For examples of the
reiteration of the prevailing view by the press, see Bus. WK., Oct. 12, 1974. For a critical
review of this literature, see Glickman, Urban Impact Analysts, in 2 PUBLIC POLICY AND MAN-
AGEMENT 105 U. Crecire ed. 1981).
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when public officials do not make corresponding reductions in expendi-
tures.5 The evolving fiscal strains of the cities are not merely the result
of a contracting municipal economy. They are also a result of ex-
panding municipal expenditures. In the face of shrinking resources, city
officials permitted city budgets to balloon. 6
While fiscal strains have been endemic in the history of American cit-
ies, this particular explanation of fiscal strain has gained prominence
only in the last decade. The explanations advanced prior to the recent
spate of local fiscal crises were distinctly different. Some focused on the
fragmentation of municipal governments, which prevented jurisdictions
with expenditure needs from capturing the necessary revenues. Others
stressed the misallocation of functional responsibilities among local ju-
risdictions that caused the mismatching of costs of providing facilities
and services with revenue capacities or beneficiaries. While both of
these earlier diagnoses were superficial, they did point to problems in
the organization of government, and problems in the organization of
government can be ameliorated by political action.
The explanation which has now become fashionable is markedly dif-
ferent. It is grander, and more somber. It echoes the worldview of 19th
century Social Darwinism by invoking a species of natural law to ex-
plain the troubles of our cities. This natural law is the law of the mar-
ket, and is presumably inexorable in its judgments. When capital
disinvests from our older central cities, it does so in accord with the
workings of market law. City governments and their populations must
also accede to this law, and settle for less. In the words of a 1982 Rea-
gan administration report on urban policy:
Too often the Federal Government has been called upon to intervene to
insulate individuals, businesses and communities from the consequences of
changes brought about by evolving technology, shifting market conditions,
5. In the interests of brevity, this article does not delve into the ambiguities attending
such phrases as "fiscal strain" or "fiscal crisis," or the appropriate statistical indicators of
strain or crisis. By and large, fiscal strain refers to the circumstance when municipal operat-
ing budgets exceed current revenues and grants-in-aid, or when municipalities cannot borrow
money to finance their capital budgets because they are closed out of the capital markets.
However, these circumstances are not unambiguous. As the New York City fiscal crisis made
clear, calculations of both revenues and expenditures are subject to manipulation. In addi-
tion, the sudden decision by the banks not to lend money to that city could not have been
simply a reflection of objective fiscal conditions, which had in fact been worsening for some
years. See Alcaly & Bodian, New York's Fiscal Crisis and the Economy, in THE FISCAL CRISIS OF
AMERICAN CITIES 30 (R. Alcaly & D. Mermelstein eds. 1977).
6. I hesitate to use the term "crisis" to describe these developments. As observers have
noted, the calling of a crisis is very much a political act, and should be understood as a
political strategy for managing municipal fiscal strain. See Friedland, Piven & Alford, supra
note 3.
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and altered social attitudes. Intervention can do more harm than good by
slowing the process of individual and collective adjustment to changes. 7
In some variations of this argument, the Malthusian worldview
emerges even more boldly; it is said that cities, like other natural crea-
tures, must die when their time has come-the only question being
whether government policies will enable them to die gracefully.8
While the economic base of many older central cities has indisputably
eroded, and with it the revenue capacity of their municipal govern-
ments, the explanation for this development advanced by the prevailing
school of thought is far from indisputable. One aspect of urban decline
was the movement of industry, commerce, and wealthier urban resi-
dents to the suburbs.9 The prevailing view attributes suburbanization to
the unfolding of the law of the market as investors and citizens alike
maximized their self-interest by leaving the central cities. Industries
relocated in the suburbs largely because post-World War II linear indus-
trial construction led investors and developers to seek the more ample
space afforded by suburban locations. Residents left because the pros-
perity of the post-World War II period permitted them to indulge their
preferences for home ownership and sideyards. Commercial investors
left in response to the new and more prosperous market thereby created,
and to acquire the large spaces demanded by the new style of automo-
bile shopping. All of these developments are depicted as market phe-
7. Quoted in N.Y. Times, June 10, 1982 at 25, col. 6. This argument is similar to that
offered by a panel appointed by President Carter, which referred to the "deep-seated and
inexorable historical transformation" affecting the cities. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR A
NATIONAL AGENDA FOR THE EIGHTIES, supra note 4, at 69.
8. Baer, for example, scolds us for denying that natural death occurs in the urban realm
much as it occurs in personal life, a denial he attributes to the American taboo on death and
dying generally. See Baer, On the Death of Cities, 45 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1976). Similarly, Starr,
writing in the wake of the New York City fiscal crisis, argued that the city ought to plan for
its inevitable "shrinkage," rather than wait until "after doomsday has come." Starr, Making
New York Smaller, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 105.
9. The decentralization of corporate investment, and particularly manufacturing invest-
ment, into suburban and even rural areas is discussed in R. SCHEMMER, MAKING BUSINESS
LOCATION DECISIONS 199-210 (1982). Mollenkopf discusses the impact of this movement on
the location of employment:
By 1980, the suburban rings . . .contained 41.6 percent of all manufacturing employ-
ment, while nonmetropolitan areas accounted for another 33.2 percent . . . During the
1960s alone, the proportion of the blue collar labor force which worked and lived in
central cities . . .declined from 47.6 percent to 35.6 percent of the total. By contrast,
the percentage who lived and worked in the suburbs rose from 30.2 to 36.1 percent, while
the total proportion of blue collar workers residing in the suburbs increased from 45.7 to
54.6 percent.
J. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY 38 (1983). See generally, Kasarda, The Changing Occu-
pational Structure of the American Metropolis, in THE CHANGING FACE OF THE SUBURBS (B.
Schwartz ed. 1976). By the 1970s, even suburban growth in the older metropolitan areas had
slowed. The contraction of the central cities accelerated during that decade with the ten
largest cities showing population losses ranging from ten percent to more than twenty per-
cent. J. MOLLENKOPF, supra, at 214.
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nomena, proceeding through the individual decisions of rational actors
seeking to maximize their material self-interest.
Grand and somber though it may be, the dominant explanation of
troubles in the big cities ignores as much as it explains. It ignores the
role of government and politics not only in responding to economic life,
but also in forming economic life. Would the industrial investors have
relocated as readily without highway, water and sewer grants made
available by federal policies? Or without federal tax laws that provided
incentives for investment in new facilities rather than the refurbishment
of old ones?' 0 Would as many have moved, or as quickly? Would so
many urban residents have been so eager to become suburban home-
owners without the enormous advantage of government constructed
highways?" Or without the price advantages yielded by federal low
cost mortgages and federal income tax benefits?' 2 Without highway
programs, and the population shifts they encouraged, would the retail
trades have been attracted to suburban locations on so large a scale?
Alternatively, suppose an entirely different pattern of federal subsidies
had emerged, generating large incentives for the refurbishment of older
housing, mass transit, and the service infrastructure of the cities. Is it
conceivable that this would have been without effect? In other words,
were the developments to which urban economic decline is attributed
produced by individual rational actors seeking to maximize their self-
interest in relation to other rational actors, or were they produced by the
same rational actors seeking to maximize their self-interest in the con-
text of new conditions created by state policies? Was it economics or
politics that produced the urban fiscal crisis? Or, more reasonably, was
it the interaction of economics and politics, in a society in which econ-
omy and polity have become ever more densely intertwined, each both
cause and effect of the other?
Consider also the more recent shift of investment to the sunbelt. This
10. See B. Berry, Inner City Futures, (paper presented to the Conference on Dynamics of
Modern Industrial Cities, Sept. 28, 1978) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review) ("Histori-
cally, perhaps the most consistent bias in the federal tax code has been the favoritism given to
investment in the improvement and repair of existing structures.").
11. Mollenkopf has written of the impact of the new transportation networks on the de-
velopment of the Boston and San Francisco metropolitan areas. In Boston, the suburban
population increased by 50 percent after Route 128 was opened in 1952; the freeway also
attracted the growing electronics industry. Sixty-eight new plants with 4.5 million square feet
of space were built along the freeway between March 1954 and June 1956 alone. In San
Francisco, the federally funded Bay Bridge and Golden Gate Bridge made possible an even
stronger spurt of suburban growth, with suburban employment increasing by 38 percent in
the 1950's. J. MOLLENKOPF, supra note 9, at 142-144.
12. For an exhaustive examination of the differential impact of federal housing subsidies,
including income tax write-offs for private homeowners, see H.J. AARON, SHELTER AND SUB-
SIDIES 53-73 (1972).
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is another development often attributed to a market calculus. To be
sure, labor costs and tax costs were typically lower in sunbelt locations.
The long-term movement of labor-intensive manufacturing, beginning
with the relocation of the textile industry at the end of the 19th century,
is easily understood in these terms. But even that historic trend cannot
be isolated from key government policies which helped to account for
regional disparities in labor costs. In particular, the use of cheap labor
in the South owed much to the caste system, and the caste system was as
much an expression of politics as of economics. Blacks were kept in
place by state and local laws which disenfranchised and segregated
them,' 3 and by state and local government violence which curbed chal-
lenges to caste boundaries. Furthermore, the caste policies of the south-
ern states survived for nearly a century because they were tacitly and
sometimes explicitly endorsed by the national government. ,4
National labor policy has played a similar role in ratifying regional
disparities in labor costs. As the unionization of industrial workers
spread in the aftermath of the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act in 1935, states in low-wage regions undermined the rights granted
labor under the Act with state right-to-work laws, which were then sanc-
13. These laws were not limited to the South, of course. See, for example, the discussion
by the New Jersey Supreme Court of the effects of exclusionary zoning in Southern Burling-
ton County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158, 210-11 n.5, 456 A.2d 390, 415-16
n.5 (1983):
• ..since World War II, there has been a great movement of commerce, industry, and
people out of the inner cities and into the suburbs. At the same time, however, exclusion-
ary zoning made these suburbs largely inaccessible to lower income households. Besides
depriving the urban poor of an opportunity to share in the suburban development, this
exclusion also increased the relative concentration of poor in the cities and thereby has-
tened the flight of business and the middle class to the suburbs. The vicious cycle set in
as increased business and middle-class flight led to more urban decay, and more urban
decay led to more flight, etc.
14. While the United States Supreme Court, at least during Earl Warren's tenure as
Chief Justice, was closely identified with the struggle to end legalized discrimination, the
Supreme Court in the late 19th and early 20th centuries also accepted southern caste policies.
See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (states had the
right to maintain their school systems as they saw fit, even where a school district did not
provide equal facilities for black children); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (state
codes requiring that voters read and interpret any section of the state constitution to the
satisfaction of the voting official were not unconstitutional because they did not on their face
discriminate against blacks); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana
law mandating separate but equal accommodations in train coaches travelling within the
state); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Congress may not directly prohibit discrimina-
tion in accommodations).
For scholarly discussions of these cases, see Bernstein, Case Law in Plessy v. Ferguson, 47 J.
NEGRO HIST. 192 (1962); Bernstein, Plessy v. Ferguson: Conservative SociologicalJurisprudence,
48 J. NEGRO HIST. 196 (1963); Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court, 30 MINN. L. REV. 219
(1946); Note, Is Racial Segregation Consistent with Equal Protection of the Laws? Plessy v. Ferguson
Reexamined, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1949); Note, Segregation in Publi Schools-A Violation of
"Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 YALE L.J. 1059 (1947).
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tioned by the national government in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.1 5
The predictable result was that unionization was impeded in the South,
and wages consequently remained lower. The effects are still evident
today. 16
The impact of these longstanding trends in regional economic devel-
opment has been perceptible since the turn of the century, when the
textile mills of New England began to move south to take advantage of
lower labor costs and a more docile labor force. While the effects on
particular towns were sometimes considerable, the departure of some
low-wage and intensely competitive industries was offset for a long pe-
riod by the fantastic expansion of other industries. Only with the slow-
down of industrial expansion in the late 1960s was the impact of
regional shifts on the older cities felt more deeply. New national poli-
cies, especially the expansion of defense related industries in the South,
the concentration of military installations in the sunbelt, and the growth
of the aerospace and electronics industries, accelerated the trend. All of
these industries are critically dependent on the government policies that
support them and promote their regional concentration.17 Furthermore,
15. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or appli-
cation of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment in any state or territory in which such execution or application is prohibited
by state or territorial law.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982) (amend-
ing National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 14, 49 Stat. 449, 457 (1935)). See
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of right-to-work laws). See generally, P. SULTAN, RIGHT-TO-WORK
LAWS: A STUDY IN CONFLICT (1958).
For an example of a current right-to-work provision, see the Arizona Constitution:
No person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain employment because of
non-membership in a labor organization, nor shall the State or any subdivision thereof,
or any corporation, individual or association of any kind enter into any agreement, writ-
ten or oral, which excludes any person from employment or continuation of employment
because of non-membership in a labor organization.
ARIZ. CONST. art. XXV.
16. The percentage of workers who are union members in the nineteen "right-to-work"
states is only half the percentage in the remaining states. See F.F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD,
POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 169-70 (1977). For data illustrating the wage and unionization
differentials between older industrial cities in the Northeast and Midwest on the one hand,
and growing cities in the Southwest on the other, seeJ. MOLLENKOPF, supra note 9, at 223.
17. This role of federal programs in stimulating development in the Southwest is not just
a recent phenomenon. One commentator has attributed the initial growth of San Diego,
Phoenix, San Antonio, and the Santa Clara Valley to federal expenditures on military pro-
duction in those areas during World War II. J. MOLLENKOPF, supra note 9, at 217-18. For a
discussion of the more recent impact of federal contracts on regional shifts in growth, see
Watkins and Perry, Regional Change and the Impact of Uneven Urban Development, in THE RISE OF
THE SUNBELT CITIES 19, 46-51 (D. Perry & A. Watkins eds. 1977). The shift in investment
was sectoral as well as regional. Investment moved into new product lines requiring skills
that workers from the old manufacturing industries did not possess. Those workers would
therefore have been displaced even if they had been able to follow capital to the new homes of
these industries. See Walton, The Internationalzation of Capital and Class Structures in the Advanced
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the ease with which industries less directly dependent on government
expenditures shifted investment to the sunbelt owed much to the fact
that a costly public infrastructure, particularly highways and water
projects, was being financed by the federal government.18
The combined effect of federal programs has been a decline in the
components of cities' fiscal capacity. Manufacturing jobs in the central
cities have dropped sharply, a drop only partially offset by the expan-
sion of the service sector. Meanwhile, manufacturing jobs in non-metro-
politan areas and in the South have continued to increase.' 9 Population
and personal income have shifted in a parallel pattern, marking a trend
that the 1980 census indicates is accelerating. 20
The federal government has become so involved in the American
economy that it is no longer possible to account for any major economic
development without reference to public policy. The economic base of
the older cities is contracting, and with it the revenue capacities of cen-
tral city governments. But this development cannot be understood en-
tirely as the consequence of market processes, operating according to
market laws. There were market actors, to be sure, but these actors
made their decisions in the context of an economy in which government
programs had come to play an enormous role. In that sense, the market
had come to be penetrated by government, and therefore by politics.
Nor was it simply that market actors took advantage of government pol-
icies. Assuming that they were, as the market perspective tells us, ra-
tional and self-seeking, then it is reasonable to presume that they also
Countries, in WORLD EXCHANGE AND DOMINATION (A. Portes & J. Walton eds. 1980). The
low skill assembly jobs of the mass production industries largely shifted to the Third World.
See Reich, The Next American Frontier, ATL. MONTHLY, April, 1983 at 97-108.
18. For analysis of the impact of federal investments in highways and water and sewer
projects on the pattern of regional economic development, see 3 S. BARRO, THE URBAN IM-
PACTS OF FEDERAL POLICIES (1978); Watkins, Good Business Climates: The Second War Between
the States, DISSENT, Fall, 1980, at 476.
19. By the 1970s, the South was losing ground to the Caribbean and South Asia in the
competition for new investment in labor intensive manufacturing. As Bluestone and Harri-
son have shown, even this shift can be attributed in part to American tax and tariff provi-
sions. They have concluded that because of the peculiarities of the American tax code, the
effective tax on the foreign earnings of U.S. corporations in 1972 was only five percent. Provi-
sions in the U.S. Tariff Code have similar effects. Some federal programs, including the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (see 22 U.S.C. § 2191-94 (1984)), the Commodity
Credit Corporation (see 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1982)), and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (see 12
U.S.C. § 632 (1982)), actually subsidize foreign investment. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON,
THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 129-33 (1982). See also P. MUSGRAVE, UNITED
STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME 1-162 (1969).
20. Between 1969 and 1976, investment in new plants in the United States created about
3.6 million jobs each year, while plant closings wiped out 3.2 million jobs each year. The
pattern varied sharply within and among regions, with the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic show-
ing a net loss of jobs and a parallel loss of population. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra
note 19, at 27-34, app. Table A. 1 (jobs); id. at 99, Table 4.2 (population).
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promoted the policies which gave them economic advantage.2 '
While these were market actors, they had moved from a sphere where
action is viewed as governed by economic laws to a sphere where action
is understood as voluntarist. Moreover, state leaders were not merely
reactive in this process. They were actors in their own right, filtering
their responses to the demands of market interests in terms of their own
distinctively political objectives.2 2 The conception of this complex inter-
play of politics and markets as merely the playing out of market forces is
not only analytically deficient, but also intensely ideological. By defin-
ing politics as economics, the prevailing view attempts to define the poli-
cies which shaped the circumstances of our cities as beyond the reach of
democratic political influences.
B. The Logic of Increased Compensatory Programs
The other aspect of urban fiscal strain acknowledged by the prevail-
ing explanation concerns patterns of municipal expenditure that failed
to adjust to diminishing municipal resources. A contracting tax base
alone would produce a multitude of problems for the people of a city, as
municipal jobs and services were cut back. Declining revenues only pro-
duce fiscal problems, however, when jobs and services are not corre-
spondingly reduced, and expenditures outrun revenues. Expenditures
in the older cities obviously did outrun revenues, typically even rising
while the tax base was contracting. Within the framework of the domi-
nant explanation of the urban fiscal crisis, this phenomenon is viewed as
perverse, since avowedly economic realities were ignored by political ac-
tors. In other words, the facts of contracting municipal resources are
seen as economic facts, and therefore rock-hard and inexorable. By con-
trast, the perversity which led cities to spend more than they took in
reflects merely political facts, and political facts are depicted as "soft"
because they derive from willful human decisions.2 3
21. This presumption is confirmed by existing records of corporate lobbying activities. See
E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF (1935); G. MCCONNELL,
PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966) (accounts of business political influ-
ence). See also Salamon & Siegfried, Economic Power and Political Influence. The lmpact of Industy
Structure on Public Poh, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1026-43 (1977) (empirical approach to rela-
tionship of business to political power). See generally A. FRITSCHLER & B. Ross, BUSINESS
REGULATION AND GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING (1980).
22. See Piven, The Great Societ as Political Strateg, in THE POLITICS OF TURMOIL 271-83
(R. Cloward & F.F. Piven eds. 1974) (describing state leaders as actors with distinctive pur-
poses arising from the exigencies of governance). See also C. LINDBLOM, supra note 1, at 122-
26.
23. An important line of argument and research attempts to interpret expenditure deci-
sions in terms of quasi-economic models. This public choice literature tries to interpret pat-
terns of municipal expenditure and taxation as the result of the influence of voter-taxpayers
who will elect the officials that provide the preferred combination of services and taxes, or
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That expenditures reflected politics is neither remarkable nor repre-
hensible. The public budget allocates both public funds and public au-
thority, which represent the means to power, wealth, security, and/or
survival for different groups. Thus, it is always the focus of group con-
tention. 24 What was remarkable was not that expenditures reflected
politics, but rather that new groups were entering the contest, and press-
ing for increased municipal expenditures. The new groups had become
significant political actors because changes in the agricultural econ-
omy-stimulated by still other federal policies-had thrust them first
into the cities and then into the electoral representative system. These
new contestants were the people who ultimately bore the brunt of the
shifts in investments spurred by federal policies.
Economic change typically generates population movements as well
as shifts in the circumstances of populations, with the result that new
political groupings and new political claims emerge. This pattern char-
acterized the American experience in the post-World War II period.
American agriculture, particularly the historically labor-intensive agri-
culture of the South, threw off excess laborers who, having been eco-
nomically displaced by modernization, had little alternative but to
migrate to the big cities.25
Like all major contemporary economic developments in the United
States, these developments in agriculture did not occur simply as a result
of market and technological processes. Federal subsidies and loans had
much to do with the advance of mechanization. 26 Mechanization, in
move to a locality that more closely matches their preferences. Fiscal strain or crisis in this
model is attributed to various imperfections in the market mechanisms that translate the
preferences of voter-taxpayers into public policy. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF
PUBLIC FINANCE (1959); P. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981); Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, in THE NEW URBANIZATION (S. Greer ed. 1968).
24. Piven & Friedland, supra note 3. With these assertions I put myself squarely into the
camp of what Peterson calls "bargaining models" of local tax and expenditure policies. P.
PETERSON, supra note 23. Peterson develops what he calls a "unitary model" which treats
"internal conflicts and competing preferences within a political system" as "theoretically ir-
relevant." He argues that municipal expenditure decisions can be derived from a series of
"environmental" variables which constrain the choices of policy-makers striving to increase
the economic prosperity of the local community. One problem with this model is precisely
that it is "unitary;" it posits a unity of interest among urban residents in policies that promote
economy productivity, even though the effects of particular forms of economic growth on
different groups in the urban population are clearly variable. Another problem is that the
market calculus he asserts to be the basis of municipal policy would presumably preclude
policies that lead to fiscal strain, except as the idiosyncratic result of imperfect information.
25. See PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON RURAL POVERTY, THE PEO-
PLE LEFT BEHIND (1967) (summary of the displacement effects of agricultural modernization
during this period); T. DUNBAR, OUR LAND Too (1969) (detailed study of agricultural dis-
placement in the southern rural economy).
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turn, not only rendered much agricultural labor superfluous, but also
stimulated the enlargement of agricultural holdings so that small farm-
ers were also displaced. 27 Meanwhile, federal supports for idle land ag-
gravated the tendency toward labor surplus, since profits could be made
without cultivation.28 Federal welfare policies gave the agricultural
states license to effectively refuse income supports to the local unem-
ployed, 29 helping to ensure that displaced tenants, farmers and share-
croppers would make their way to the cities. These conditions
combined to accelerate the migration of the displaced agricultural
workforce, largely black and southern, to the older cities whose econo-
mies could not absorb them. Between 1940 and 1966, 3.7 million blacks
left the South for the industrial North, most of them going to the large
central cities.30 By the end of this period, blacks were the most urban
people in the United States. 3 1
The vast migration of blacks, and of Hispanics who were being dis-
placed during the same period, occurred at the same time that millions
of older urban residents were leaving the central cities in response to the
. . .the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to conduct and to stimulate
research . . . relating to the improvement of the quality of, and the development of new
and improved methods of the production, marketing, distribution, processing and utili-
zation of plant and animal commodities ....
Amendment to the Bankhead-Jones Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 733, Ch. 966, 60 Stat. 1082,
1083 (1946).
27. Between 1940 and 1960 the number of farms in the South dropped by half, while the
size of the average farm increased from 123 to 217 acres. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 460-61
(1976). See also PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON RURAL POVERTY, supra
note 25, at ix-x.
28. See Agriculture Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 540, Ch. 327, 70 Stat. 188 (1956).
29. The AFDC program, Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 49 Stat. 60
(1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601-10 (1981), was a prime example. At the time this was
the most important program available to agricultural workers who were not covered by un-
employment insurance. The states not only were permitted to set grant levels, but also were
able to pass a host of exclusionary rules. F.F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE
POOR, 205-06 (1971). In the South this license was effectively used to exclude most of the
black poor from the program until well into the 1960s. For example, during the 1950s, de-
spite deepening distress among displaced agricultural workers, the AFDC rolls in the South
did not grow. To the contrary, this was the period when Southern states were enacting such
new exclusions as "suitable home" and "employable mother" laws. See, e.g., 1958 Miss. Gen.
Laws 943 (1958) ("suitable homes"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 233 (West 1963) ("suitable homes"
and illegitimacy); ALABAMA MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, Part I,
Ch. 11, § 6 (1964) ("man-in-the-house").
30. White agricultural workers were also displaced during this period, but they were not
as likely to migrate to the biggest cities, because smaller cities and towns were not as inhospi-
table to them as they were to black migrants. Moreover, displaced white agricultural workers
were not as likely to be denied welfare supports, in part because the states which relied on a
white agricultural labor force tended to have less restrictive welfare practices.
31. In 1940, only half of all blacks lived in urban areas. The proportion reached 62
percent in 1950, 73 percent in 1960, and 80 percent in 1965. CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND
MARKETING, INC., THE NEGRO POPULATION: 1965 ESTIMATES AND 1970 PROJECTIONS 8
(1966).
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overall shift of investment. The enormous turnover in population was
bound to cause political repercussions, simply because large shifts in
population always undermine existing patterns of political organization.
Older patterns of leadership weaken as established constituents shrink in
numbers and influence, while new groups bring new demands and dif-
ferent styles of organization and action.
American cities have always had to cope with the instabilities gener-
ated by massive population change. In the 19th century, a distinctive
and remarkable mode of political organization developed to deal with
the potentially unsettling effects of generations of new migrants: the big
city political machine. Machine politics meant that some of the author-
ity and wealth of a municipality could be converted into favors, friend-
ship, and representation that cultivated the allegiance of diverse
immigrant groups. By World War II, however, most big city machines
had been greatly weakened or even destroyed as a result of the efforts of
municipal reformers and the subsequent influence of federal grants-in-
aid. City governments had by and large become "clean" as bureau-
cratic politics replaced machine politics. The reform battles that re-
sulted in the elaboration of bureaucratic structures and rules weakened
machine bosses by depriving them of control of municipal jobs and mu-
nicipal policies, and therefore of the patronage on which they de-
pended. 32 But bureaucratization also meant that the jobs and services
which had earlier been used to cultivate allegiance among newcomers
were no longer easily dispensed to new groups. The operation of the
bureaus became constrained by civil service regulations, and later by
union contracts. The protracted conflict in New York City between mi-
nority groups and the school system, and particularly between minority
groups and organized teachers, for control of school jobs and school pol-
icy illustrates this development. The challenge by minorities was neces-
sarily a challenge to the rules of the educational bureaucracy, and to the
contract of the United Federation of Teachers.3 3 It was not that the
bureaucratization of the goods, services and honors controlled by city
governments had depoliticized municipal administrations. Rather,
bureaucratization provided a set of devices which protected the stakes of
groups who were already the beneficiaries of municipal largesse, and
32. More extensive discussions of the bureaucratization of city politics can be found in
Lowi, Foreword to H. GOSNELL, MACHINE POLITICS: CHICAGO MODEL ix (1968); Piven, The
Urban Crisis. Who ot What, and Why? in THE POLITICS OF TURMOIL 314 (R. Cloward & F.F.
Piven eds. 1974); Shefter, New York City's Fiscal Cnsis, 48 PUB. INTEREST 98 (1977).
33. For a case study of this confrontation, see CONFRONTATION AT OCEAN HILL-
BROWNSVILLE (M. Beruba & M. Gittell eds. 1969).
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thus impeded the use of municipal resources to integrate the post-World
War II newcomers.
Political problems of this scale in the big cities inevitably reverberate
upward to the federal government. The mechanisms of transmission are
not mysterious. Urban business interests lobby, and urban political
leaders carry weight because of their influence on the votes of organized
urban constituencies in national elections. The first main response of
the federal government to the pressures generated by the economic shifts
that were weakening the urban economy on the one hand, and bringing
agricultural migrants to the cities on the other hand, was the urban re-
newal program, 34 a response that suited the interests of both downtown
businessmen and city mayors. Federal subsidies were made available for
the acquisition of land in "blighted" central city areas; this land was
subsequently resold to private developers at below market rates.35 That
urban renewal came to be known as "black removal" was not an acci-
dent, for the designation of blighted areas for commercial or residential
redevelopment was frequently influenced by the poverty and the race of
the residents of these areas. Downtown businessmen and mayors could
unite around a program which would return wealthier customers and
taxpayers to the urban core. At the same time, urban renewal would
remove the newcomers whose enlarging presence threatened to acceler-
ate white flight and cause fissures in urban political organizations that
could not easily incorporate the minorities, yet could not, as their
number grew, continue indefinitely to exclude them either.
Given the powerful economic forces and large government programs
that were combining to transform the cities and their populations, ur-
ban renewal was not equal to its task. Indeed, urban renewal exas-
cerbated the political problems of municipal officials. On the one hand,
it did not reverse the patterns of in- and out-migration that were weak-
ening the big city political organizations. On the other hand, renewal
itself became a major source of grievance to the largely black and His-
panic populations who were displaced. Political instabilities in the na-
tion's largest cities took form in the massive electoral defections by
blacks from the Democratic Party in the presidential elections of 1956,
34. Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, 78 Stat. 769 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12, 15, 20, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
35. For discussion of urban renewal as a strategy to promote urban economic growth, see
generally Harvey, The Political Economy of Urbanization in Advanced Capitalist Societies, in THE SO-
CIAL ECONOMY OF CITIES 119 (G. Gappert and H. Rose eds. 1975); Mollenkopf, The Post- War
Polihts of Urban Development, 5 POL. & Soc'Y 247 (1975); S. Elkins, Cities Without Power (pa-
per presented at the Conference on Urban Choice and State Power, Cornell University, June,
1977) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
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and their rather reluctant return in the election of 1960.36 This develop-
ment signalled that the newcomers were becoming a political force,
pressing their own claims in city and national politics. But both the
claims they made and the responses they received were shaped by com-
plex conditions that were not of their own choosing.
If the continued incumbence of local political leaders was best secured
by excluding the newcomers, the political fortunes of the national Dem-
ocratic party were not, for the national party depended on large plurali-
ties from the biggest cities to carry the industrial states. Accordingly,
the Democratic regimes of the 1960s tried to cope with the signs of erod-
ing support in their big city strongholds with a series of programs that
compensated for municipal political rigidities and a weakening econ-
omy with federally funded services and jobs oriented to the new and
politically volatile populations. Beginning in 1962, a series of new pro-
grams were proposed by the White House and passed by the Congress,
each designed to ameliorate some social problem, such as juvenile delin-
quency, community mental health, poverty, educational deprivation, or
blighted neighborhoods.3 7 These programs gave the already hard-
pressed cities new monies, but most of the funds were tagged for the
creation of new municipal jobs or services and thus actually increased
municipal expenditures, albeit with the benefit of federal grants-in-
aid.38
The broad anti-poverty and anti-racist rhetoric associated with the
federally initiated programs ensured that the demands of ghetto popula-
tions would not remain neatly confined to those programs, however. A
number of the programs, particularly those included in the Economic
36. A Gallup Poll taken after the 1956 election concluded that "of all the major groups in
the nation's population, the one that shifted most to the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket . . was the
Negro voter." Moreover, there was a sharp decline in black turnout, particularly in the
northern cities. Whereas Stevenson won 80 percent of the black vote in 1952, he won only 60
percent in 1956. Some-but only some-of those voters returned to Democratic columns in
1960, when Kennedy won 68 percent of the black vote, helping him to carry a number of key
industrial states by very narrow margins. See F.F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 16, at
211-229 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Community Mental Health Centers Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2681-2687 (amended
1975); Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. (current version at 20
U.S.C. § 1132a el. seq.) (1976); Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961,
42 U.S.C. § 2541-2548 (expired 1967).
38. Brown and Erie present persuasive evidence that the federal programs created during
this period triggered a large expansion of black public employment. The expansion occurred
mainly at the state and local level, principally in social welfare programs created or expanded
in response to federal legislation. They estimate the aggregate employment impact of federal
initiatives at two million new jobs, almost all of which were state and local. Moreover, fully
55 percent of the net increase in employment for blacks that occurred between 1960 and 1976
was in the public sector. Much of it was concentrated in state and local programs stimulated
by the federal government. See Brown & Erie, Blacks andthe Legacy of the Great Society, 29 PuB.
POL'Y 299, 305 (1981).
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Opportunity Act of 1964 and called "the war on poverty," were backed
by only limited funds, but they provided significant federal ideological
legitimation of minority group claims. This legitimation was used by
the new groups to press their claims for services, jobs, and honors against
traditional municipal agencies. The much-maligned federal policies
which provoked this response came to be known as the Great Society. 39
To compensate for the failures of municipal politics turned out to be
no simple matter, however, because those failures were not simply the
vestigial results of bureaucratic arrangements. Rather, these bureau-
cratic arrangements reflected still active and significant local political
forces. Federal policies provided compensation for new groups and
prodded them to make demands on the regular apparatus of city gov-
ernment. Older groups with entrenched claims, particularly civil service
employees whose interests were directly challenged by concessions to
blacks, inevitably responded with contending claims. Demands on city
governments escalated from all sides, and insecure urban political offi-
cials acceded to demands on all sides. Contention undermined urban
regimes, and the ensuing weakness of urban governments in turn incited
and strengthened the claimants. Consequently, contending claims on
municipal budgets escalated rapidly.4
The increase of popular claimants did not stem the tide of concessions
to traditional beneficiaries of city government largesse, such as the real
estate and construction industries. Indeed, instability may well have in-
creased the number and size of tax concessions and subsidies granted to
local business supporters. Insecure politicans are more eager, not less,
for business sector support and contributions. 4t Continuing federal sub-
sidies for urban renewal also committed municipal governments to pro-
vide "in-kind" contributions in the form of city services, capital
improvements and property tax rebates. Such drains on municipal
39. For a more extensive development of this political analysis of the Great Society Pro-
grams, see Piven, supra note 22, at 271-83; Piven, The New Urban Programs, in THE POLITICS OF
TURMOIL 284-313 (R. Cloward & F.F. Piven eds. 1974).
40. For a more complete discussion of the political pressures underlying rising municipal
and state expenditures, see Piven, supra note 32. See also Kantor & David, The Political Economy
of Change in Urban Budgeting Politics. A Frameworkfor Analysis and a Case Study, 13 BRIT. J. POL.
Sci. 251, 269 (1983).
41. The fissures that have developed recently in the Chicago machine are bringing some
of these relations with business to light. Edward R. Vrdolyak, who is leading the City Coun-
cil's fight against Mayor Harold Washington, is also head of the Building and Zoning Com-
mittee which decides what real estate developers are granted zoning variances and city
property leases. Another alderman was recently on trial for 33 counts of selling licenses and
jobs in the sheriff's department. In May, 1983, the New York Times reported that ten former
aldermen were in prison for such practices. As one Council member commented, "[tihere is a
lot of money involved in running the City Council . . . The cable television franchise alone
involves millions of dollars." N.Y. Times, May 14, 1983, at 7, col. 4.
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budgets generally attracted less public fanfare than the expansion of
jobs and services. Even where opposition to redevelopment provoked
publicity, municipal contributions to urban redevelopment could be
seen as eminently reasonable, explained and perhaps understood as ex-
penditures which would ultimately yield higher tax revenues. As it
turned out, however, these revenue increases rarely offset municipal in-
vestments. Furthermore, the leverage exerted by such investment inter-
ests over city officials increased precisly because the municipal tax base
was contracting. In the context of ongoing large scale capital flight, the
threat of disinvestment became an even more powerful political weapon
to wield for tax and subsidy concessions. 4 2
Federal policies therefore again intruded on municipal politics, this
time on a very large scale. These policies were different from those that
had previously undermined urban economies and promoted rural mi-
gration to the cities. The new policies were an effort to respond to the
disturbances and demands generated by the victims of economic
change. These policies increased local fiscal capacities through grants-
in-aid for expanded public jobs, income transfers, and social services
rather than by increasing the cities' ability to raise revenues from their
own sources. The federal policies were designed to compensate urban
governments and urban residents for economic decline. At the same
time, however, they stimulated greater demands on revenue-poor city
governments. 43
From a fiscal perspective, the policies of compensation had perverse
effects on municipal budgets. But from a political perspective, it was the
investment policies that had perverse effects on municipal and national
politics. Government policies that support investment are often as-
sumed also to support the economic growth that redounds to the benefit
of the entire population by generating jobs and income. When invest-
ment has these effects, the policies which suit investors also work to win
votes.44 But the policies which promoted new investment in recent de-
42. The reluctance of local governments to raise taxes and expenditures to offset cuts in
federal programs in 1981 and 1982 evidences this pressure, as does the eagerness of some state
governments to use the increase in revenues generated by the current economic recovery to
justify the proposal of additional tax cuts. See Quint, Economic Scene: Local Fiscal Di eullies,
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1983, at D2, col. 1-3. See also D. Klingman, The Impact of Changing
Intergovernmental Relations on State and Local Expenditures and Revenues (paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1982)
(on file with the Yale Law &Policy Review).
43. From 1960 to 1975, state and local government receipts rose by about 11% annually,
while the gross national product increased at an average annual rate of only 7.7%. As a
consequence, local government's share of GNP rose from 9% to 14%. Quint, supra note 42, at
D2, col. 1-3.
44. The conditional and uncertain impact of economic development on popular political
support for local politicians is discussed in Piven & Friedland, supra note 3.
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cades also caused disinvestment in older urban centers. This, in turn,
led to the contraction of employment and income in the population cen-
ters that were the main base of the Democratic Party. Several of these
policies promoted disinvestment from the United States itself, as capital
took advantage of a stable international monetary framework and
favorable tariff laws by moving overseas. The result was a shift of capi-
tal's job and income-generating capacity beyond the boundaries of the
national state.45
On their face, these developments were perverse. It is not that the
compensatory programs were illogical, as some critics have charged. 46
They were very logical; it is just that the logic was political. Those bear-
ing the costs of regional economic change caused by federal policies ex-
erted sufficient pressure on the government to force the creation or
expansion of public programs that moderated some of the costs of eco-
nomic change. There was also a political logic underlying the programs
that promoted economic relocation and development. But if each set of
policies was in some sense logical, in combination they were illogical. As
both sorts of government policy developed, the results made little fiscal
sense, and even brought some cities to the brink of bankruptcy.
II. Pohtical Structure and Fiscal Crisis Politics
Analyzed apart from the concrete institutional arrangements of any
particular polity, the competing political interests which gave rise to
such different lines of state policy could be expected to battle. Each
political interest group was struggling to push policy in a direction an-
tagonistic to the interests of the other. In another type of polity, the
contradictory effects of investor policies and compensatory policies
might have produced political conflict between a mobile capital and its
diverse victims. In the American polity, however, open conflict did not
emerge. Instead, the urban political battles that erupted were conflicts
among the diverse groups of victims-between blacks, Hispanics and
whites, or between employees of municipalities, residents of urban ghet-
45. There has been substantial debate about the net effects of the internationalization of
American capital in terms of domestic employment. For an extensive review of the relevant
literature, see Walton, The Internationahzaton of Capital and Class Structures in the Advanced Coun-
trtes." The Case of the United States, in WORLD EXCHANGE AND DOMINATION: ESSAYS IN THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT (A. Portes & J. Walton eds. 1980). Walton con-
cludes that while internationalization did generate new professional and managerial employ-
ment in the United States, the net effect was a reduction in blue collar employment.
46. For example, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, one of the most outspoken critics of the Great
Society, charged that the programs were simply inept. Because of the foolish counsel of lib-
eral intellectuals, said Moynihan, "[t]he government did not know what it was doing." D.
MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING 170 (1969).
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toes and taxpayers. The potential for broader conflict was blunted by
the numerous concessions made on both sides of the main fault lines of
the conflict. These concessions in turn placed a severe fiscal burden on
the older cities.
What accounts for this particular pattern of demand and response in
American politics, a pattern that produced considerable fiscal strain,
but little political conflict? Elsewhere, in collaboration with Roger
Friedland, Robert Alford, and Richard Cloward, I have proposed that
certain longstanding structural features of the American polity help to
account for the peculiarly fragmented, even incoherent, pattern of polit-
ical demands. 4 7 One such feature is the historic tendency toward the
centralization of policies crucial to investors when these policies become
the object of popular challenge in the localities. This centralization is
coupled with a tendency toward the decentralization of popularly ori-
ented policies, even when they are initiated by the federal government.
Some of the underlying reasons for this dual pattern were apparent as
early as during the creation of a national government by post-revolu-
tionary elites in the 18th century. The Founders were anxious about
popular mobilizations occurring in the states, particularly over the de-
mand for cheap money and a moratorium on the collection of debts. As
one commentator has written, "[w]hat bothered the Federalists most
about the state governments was their failure to protect the rights of
property, and in particular the rights of creditors. ' '48 The creation of a
strong national government solved this problem because ordinary citi-
zens could not organize effectively on the national level, while commer-
cial banking and landowning elites could. The usefulness of a multi-
level federal structure in promoting business interests was again evident
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when businessmen reformers,
stymied at the municipal level by political machines, obtained the poli-
cies they needed at the state level. To some extent, then, the historic
tendency toward the centralization of business politics reflected the
greater capacity of business elites for supra-local influence, a capacity
exercised when business interests were threatened by popular local mo-
bilizations. Corporate interests were following the classic strategy of
centralizing to increase their influence.
As the American economy expanded, and as American corporations
began to operate in national markets, however, another motive for cen-
47. See F.F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 3; Piven & Friedland, supra note 44; Fried-
land, Piven & Alford, supra note 3.
48. Morgan, The Argument for the States, NEW REPUBLIC, April 28, 1982,'at 29-34. See also
C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913).
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tralization emerged. Businessmen required consistent national policies
to facilitate far-flung business operations. The need for consistency was
a fundamental motive underlying the movement of corporate influence
to Washington in the Progressive period. They used their influence with
the federal government to overturn state laws regulating the railroads
and granaries won in states where farmer populists were strong.49
Meanwhile, government programs oriented toward ordinary voters,
including most neighborhood and social welfare programs, were typi-
cally decentralized. Authority to run these programs remained with lo-
cal and state governments, at least as long as the political reverberations
of popular discontent was largely confined to the local polity. Accord-
ingly, the localities remained the main focus of popular politics, because
the existence of these programs attracted and organized popular polit-
ical participation. Even when the massive political instabilities and lo-
cal revenue shortfalls of the Great Depression generated sufficient
national political pressure to force the inauguration of new federal sup-
port programs, much of the administrative authority was ceded to local
and state governments. 50
However, despite the concentration of mass political participation on
the local level, local governments are also vulnerable to business pres-
sures. Historically, in fact, they have been acutely vulnerable to threats
of capital flight precisely because such governments are territorially
bounded, while capital is not.5 1 But the potential for sharp conflicts
over policies stemming from this vulnerability of local governments to
both investors and voters has been dulled by the progressive organiza-
tional fragmentation and bureaucratization of local governments. Not
only are investment-oriented policies housed in different structures than
popularly oriented policies, but these agencies have, over time, been
49. G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963). See also C. LINDBLOM, supra
note 1, at 204-05.
50. For example, when unemployment compensation was established by the Social Secur-
ity Act of 1935, the states had great latitude in financing and administering the program.
Each state continues to have different benefit provisions today. SeeJ. PATTERSON, THE NEW
DEAL AND THE STATES 23, 91 (1969).
51. A number of analysts have argued that the inability of the local polity to control the
movement of capital and people across its boundaries inevitably means economic concerns
will dictate local political decisions. David and Kantor rely on the observation that local
polities cannot control labor and capital flows to assert that only the federal government can
afford to pursue meaningful redistributive policies. See David & Kantor, Urban Policy in the
Federal System, 16 POLITY 284 (1983). Lowi reaches a similar conclusion and stresses the need
for centrally coordinated redistributive policies. See Lowi, Public Poliy and Bureaucracy in the
United States and France, in I COMPARING PUBLIC POLICIES: SAGE YEARBOOKS IN POLITICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY 177 (1978). Although I do not disagree with these observations, I would
place a heavier explanatory emphasis on political rather than on administrative exigencies,
and on the variable capacities for mobilizing political influence by different groups at differ-
ent levels of government.
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largely removed from electoral influence. The model is the Authority or
the Special District, financed by legally protected revenue sources and
administered by officials who do not stand for election. The emergence
of these structural arrangements is not mysterious either, for they were
created during the last century in response to the political efforts of busi-
nessmen reformers who sought to shield from popular interference the
government programs on which they depended. 52
These structural arrangements preceded the contemporary period of
urban fiscal strain. But they shaped both the political demands that
generated strain, and government responses to those demands. The pol-
icies that promoted regional economic shifts were principally federal
policies, for the federal government had become the focus of political
activity by the most important national economic interests. Meanwhile,
the politics of the victims of regional economic change remained largely
localized, played out mainly in the cities where they lived and worked,
when they worked. The structure of American federalism generated this
vertical segmentation of politics. This helps to account for the fact that
the demands of diverse claimants were never joined, so that the conflict
between investor interests and the interests of victims of investor-ori-
ented policies did not emerge.
Nevertheless, the federal government could not ignore the distur-
bances emerging in the cities. Certainly, these disturbances could not be
ignored by the Democratic administrations of the 1960s, for they de-
pended on the capacity of the big city political organizations to promote
Democratic voter allegiance. Therefore, national Democratic leaders
promoted policies designed to "bail out the cities" with federal revenues
given under federal terms.53 But if these new programs blurred the ver-
tical segmentation of American politics and policy, they nevertheless fol-
lowed the outlines of horizontal fragmentation. Urban populations and
52. The current fiscal constraints confronted by local governments has spurred the
proliferation of these politically insulated agencies, and an even greater proliferation of their
spending powers. During the five years preceding August, 1982, the number of special dis-
tricts and authorities increased by 11%. Their spending increased even more rapidly, from $9
billion in 1977 to almost $25 billion in 1980. The New York Times commented, on the basis
of interviews with local political leaders, that the growth in spending was a response to new
budgetary limits placed on municipalities. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1982, at A8, col. 1. The shift
of financing of a range of business-oriented public functions into independent authorities
removes significant spending decisions from the intense public scrutiny and pressure gener-
ated by the budgetary process.
53. For example, in order to obtain certain grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, created in 1968 by the Johnson administration, the states had to comply with
12 federal regulations. See 0. STOLZ, REVENUE SHARING: LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS 6-7
(1974); see also AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, REVE-
NUE SHARING BILLS: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO SHARE FEDERAL REVENUE WITH
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 3 (1970).
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urban governments were appeased not by modification of the main out-
lines of the national policies which were promoting disinvestment from
the cities, but rather by an expansion of the range of popularly oriented
programs that we call social welfare. The federal programs were used to
prod local governments into expanding the traditional battery of popu-
larly oriented municipal jobs and services, with the effect of escalating
demands on municipal budgets.
These structural arrangements made possible the dual and illogical
policies which led to urban fiscal crisis. Disinvestment from the older
urban economies continued without challenge, while local political con-
cessions-and consequent fiscal problems-proliferated. The eruption
of "fiscal crisis" suggests there are indeed limits on these unique arrange-
ments for accommodating conflict.
There are signs of other limits as well. The expansion of federal poli-
cies that were intended to compensate the urban victims of national in-
vestment policies eroded the vertical segmentation which had in the past
muted conflict in the United States. Many of the federal programs were
channelled through local government agencies, but others were not.
Even when they were, the sheer scale of federal involvement, and the
publicity that was necessarily attached to the federal role in order for
the funds to do their political work, made the federal government's role
in popularly oriented programs highly visible. This development was
extremely significant, for popular politics were becoming nationalized.
This tendency did not begin in the 1960s; it owed much to the experi-
ence of the Great Depression, and perhaps even to the Progressive Pe-
riod. It also owed a great deal to the steady expansion and increasing
visibility of the federal government's role in the national economy in
deference to investor interests. The Great Society programs, and the
expansion of national social welfare programs with which they were as-
sociated, however, contributed substantially to the nationalization of
popular politics. In other words, while fiscal crisis on the local level
reveals one limit to the illogic of the policies which produced urban fis-
cal strain, the erosion of some of the institutional arrangements which
permitted the simultaneous pursuit of illogical policies suggests another
limit.
III. The Future Evolution of Fiscal Crisis
The Reagan administration has given the outlook associated with pre-
vailing explanations of urban fiscal woes a new prestige and scope by
invoking a species of the very same argument to justify a series of radical
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national policy shifts. 5 4 To restore economic growth, the administration
argues, the profitability of private investment has to be improved.
Therefore, large tax cuts for business and the affluent are required. If
government revenues are to be forfeited in this fashion, however, other
expenditures must be reduced. There is no choice, and certainly no
room for politics. Investors act not as political entities and not in rela-
tion to governmental policy, but merely in accord with market law. It is
only government social programs, not government investor programs,
that intrude on the market.
An ideology which unabashedly subordinates government to business
at the national level stems in part from a decrease during the last decade
in investment in new domestic productive capacity. This develop-
ment-and the Reagan administration response-suggests that the his-
torical vulnerability of local and state governments to the threat of
disinvestment has now emerged as a major factor in national politics.
Armed with its ideological justification, the Reagan administration is
rapidly altering federal policies in ways that will accelerate the pattern
of disinvestment from the cities. The defense build-up will clearly direct
new investment and new employment toward the southwest and away
from the older cities.55 Moreover, the relaxation of antitrust policies has
given a green light to corporate mergers. This shift in policy encourages
investment in less labor-intensive industries like petrochemicals rather
than the labor-intensive industries commonly found in older cities.
Meanwhile, there is little reason to expect that the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, which reduced taxation on higher income house-
holds and the largest corporations, will spur investment in the older
industrial cities.56 First, declining rates of investment in new plant ca-
pacity over the past decade have occurred despite steadily declining
54. Robert Reich observes that the revival by this administration of the creed of the sur-
vival of the fittest, with its "inevitable correlate ... that government should do little or
nothing to eliminate poverty ... has its roots in America's fallen hopes." Reich, The Return of
Social Darwinism: Ideologies of Survival, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 1982, at 34.
55. See EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, MILITARY SPENDING (1984); EMPLOY-
MENT RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE PRICE OF THE PENTAGON (1982).
56. Reich estimates that households with the highest annual incomes have been the major
beneficiaries of cuts in personal income taxes, while large corporations have been the major
beneficiaries of cuts in corporate taxes. See Reich, The Next American Fronter, ATL. MONTHLY,
March 1983, at 43; April 1983, at 97. The Congressional Budget Office projected that in 1984
households earning more than $80,000 would gain, on average, $8,390 from the tax cuts.
N.Y. Times, April 4, 1984 at Al, col. 1. These reductions contributed to a long-term shift in
the sources of federal revenues. The share of federal revenues accounted for by corporate
taxation fell from 32% in 1952 to 7% in 1983. In the same period, the share made up by
individual income taxes rose from 42% to 47%, while the share accounted for by the relatively
regressive social insurance tax had risen from 10% to 36%. See M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES ch. I (forthcoming 1985).
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rates of corporate taxation.57 Second, some analysts argue that tax cuts
which favor the very largest corporations will stimulate growth in those
national and international firms which have the greatest locational dis-
cretion. Third, a tilt in tax incentives toward the largest corporations is
a tilt toward those firms which generate less local employment, income
and local public revenues in proportion to their capital.
58
Other policy changes are more complicated in their effects. Federal
grants-in-aid for public infrastructure, which helped generate the post-
World War II pattern of economic growth and decline, have been
sharply reduced. Some of these cuts-in water and sewer facilities
grants, for example-will be felt by growing as well as declining metro-
politan areas. Other infrastructure cuts, however, such as the elimina-
tion of federal support for state and local roads in favor of the Interstate
Highway Program, will be harder on declining areas. While it is diffi-
cult and perhaps premature to disentangle the effects of these complex
shifts in the pattern of federal infrastructure supports, it is likely that the
overall impact will be felt most acutely in declining areas. Disinvest-
ment in these areas is already far advanced and hard-pressed state and
local governments will not have the revenues to compensate for reduced
federal funding.
The monetary policy of the federal government has simultaneously
undermined the capacity of municipalities to borrow on the capital
markets, as high interest rates crowd out municipal bonds. This effect
has been aggravated by a number of provisions of the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act. Since most of these bonds are now purchased by individu-
als, the sharp cut in top income tax rates reduces the incentive to
purchase tax-exempt municipals, as does the introduction of tax-free
"All-Savers" certificates. Consequently, municipalities are now paying
higher interest rates in comparison to federal and corporate interest
rates. Because debt service costs much more, municipalities are borrow-
57. See R. LEKACHMAN, GREED is NOT ENOUGH 57-79 (1982). Miller and Tomaskovic-
Devey argue that corporate tax cuts are unreliable in their effects, since they do not deter
speculation. They recommend "targeting" tax benefits to ensure investment in new plant
capacity. See S. MILLER & D. TOMASKOVic-DEVEY, RECAPITALIZING AMERICA 91 (1983).
Commerce Department figures show that reductions in the personal income tax have been
accompanied by a steady decline in personal savings as a percentage of disposable personal
income, from 6.6 percent in 1981 to 4.9 percent in 1983. Hamilton, IRA's: Goodfor the Taxpay-
ers, but Maybe Not for the Economy, Wash. Post Nat. Weekly Ed., April 16, 1984, at 18.
58. Several analysts have argued that because corporate tax cuts favor the largest and
most capital intensive firms, they will encourage acquisitions instead of investment in new
plant capacity. See B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 19, at 127-129; R.
LEKACHMAN, supra note 57, at 68-72. Friedland argues that tax subsidies reward the largest
multilocational firms, which have the greatest mobility and therefore are most likely to invest
outside metropolitan areas. See R. Friedland, Welfare States and the Geography of Economic
Growth (Jan. 1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
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ing less. 59 Finally, the federal tax cuts have eroded the revenues of some
thirty state governments that tie their tax rates to federal tax rates.
Despite the upturn in the American economy, in combination the
Reagan policies foretell the continued long-term economic decline of
many of the older central cities. Even in the event that economic
growth continues, the Reagan policies have increased the incentives for
disinvestment from the older cities, which will lead to the further reduc-
tion of local revenues. 60 In the event that the economy turns downward,
the circumstances of the older cities will be much worse.
If some of the Reagan policies can be understood as accelerating the
broad pattern of regional disinvestment, still other of the administra-
tion's policies have clearly been intended to reduce the scale of the fed-
eral programs that compensated city politicians and city residents for
some of the effects of economic disinvestment. The jobs component of
the Comprehensive Employment Act was eliminated, as was the Trade
Adjustment Assistance Program, which provided supplementary unem-
ployment payments to some workers. Sharp cuts were made-and even
sharper cuts attempted-in food programs, Medicaid, housing subsidies,
unemployment insurance, and Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren.6 ' These cuts were implemented even as the cities of the industrial
59. Business Week reports that the amount of long-term bonds issued in the municipal
market fell precipitously in 1981. Municipalities must now pay rates exceeding 80 percent of
the cost of comparable rated but taxable corporate bonds. Borrowing Gets Harder as the De-
mands Intensifv, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1981, at 154-55.
60. There is some evidence of uneven distribution of the benefits of recovery within the
older cities. Unemployment rates do not tell the whole story. For example, the number of
jobs in New York City rose to a ten-year high in 1983. However, the supply of entry level jobs
in blue-collar manufacturing fields has declined. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1984, at B6, col. 1. In
fact, in July, 1984, at the peak of the recovery, the New York Times reported that "[m]ore
people than at any time since the Depression are said to be hungry and homeless, and about
one of every four New Yorkers is below the federal poverty level." N.Y. Times, July 28, 1984,
at 1, col. 5.
61. According to an April, 1984 Congressional Budget Office Study, families earning
under $10,000 a year lost an average of $410 a year from cuts in cash and "in-kind" benefits,
while they gained $20 a year from the tax cuts. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1984, at 1, col. 1. Some
groups were more sharply affected. For example, a study carried out by the Institute for
Research on Poverty and the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services found that
AFDC recipients had lost 17% of their income from earnings, AFDC and food stamps one
year after the cuts went into effect. Meanwhile, changes in the unemployment insurance
program reduced outlays by one third, or $15 billion, from 1975 levels. Institute for Research
on Poverty, Poverty in the United States, 7 Focus 4-5 (1984). A 1984 General Accounting Office
report concluded that the 1981 legislation had decreased the national AFDC basic monthly
caseload by approximately 493,000 cases. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN EVALUATION
OF THE 1981 AFDC CHANGES: INITIAL ANALYSIS 3 (1984). The report also found that
AFDC families in five cities had experienced "substantial" income losses as a result of the
changes brought about by the legislation. Id. at 4. A study released by the Congressional
Research Service in July, 1984, indicated that the budget restrictions had caused the number
of poor to increase by at least 557,000, while the recession resulted in an increase of 1.6 mil-
lion, or 7.7 percent, in the number of the poor. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1984, at A19, col. 1.
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belt of the Midwest and Northeast were reeling from the precipitous
contraction of their industries in the 1981-82 recession. The combined
results were to increase greatly the number of people living below the
officially defined poverty line, and to widen income inequality. 62
The Democratic administrations that introduced or expanded the
compensatory programs had contrived to soften the impact of shifting
investment patterns because they were vulnerable to the voters of the
affected areas. The Reagan administration, in part because it is less po-
litically vulnerable to these voters, has not only failed to follow the cus-
tomary pattern of expanding compensatory programs, but has
vigorously set about slashing them.6 3 These policies have not only wors-
ened the circumstances of large numbers of residents of the older indus-
trial cities; they are also likely to redound negatively on city revenues.
In cities where disinvestment is far advanced, income subsidies have be-
come a prop for the local economy. In poor neighborhoods, income
transfers generate a significant portion of local sales, and also support
local real estate values by the rent payments they make possible. In this
way the federal programs were the ultimate source of a certain portion
of local sales and property tax revenues. With the programs cut, not
only will city residents be worse off, but municipal coffers will be further
depleted.
None of these studies, however, is designed to grasp fully the social impact of increasing pov-
erty. Some glimmering is suggested by a case study of the impact of cuts in one program, the
Maternal and Child Health Block Grant, in five inner-city neighborhood health centers in
Boston. The study found significant reductions both in the services offered and in the use of
the centers, paralleled by rising infant mortality rates in the census tracts served. P. Feldman
& B. Mosher, Preserving Essential Services: Effects of the MCH Block Grant on Five Inner-
city Boston Neighborhood Health Centers (paper presented at the Harvard School of Public
Health, July 1984) (on file with Yale Law & Policy Review). See also Harrington, The New
Gradgrnds, DISSENT, Spring, 1984, at 171, for a discussion of several dimensions of poverty in
the contemporary United States.
62. Relative poverty, defined as income less than 44% of the national median income
adjusted for family size, rose to 17.8% in 1982, after falling slightly during the 1965-78 period.
Moreover, the numbers of desperately poor were increasing. According to a statement by
Rudolph Penner before a House subcommittee, the proportion of those below the official
poverty line (set at $9,862 for a family of four in 1982) whose incomes were less than 75
percent of the poverty level had increased from 61% in 1978 to 68% in 1982. The poor were
also increasingly concentrated in urban areas. The percentage of the poor living in cities
increased from 54 percent in 1969 to 62 percent in 1982, despite the overall decline of the
population in the cities. Institute for Research on Poverty, supra note 61, at 7.
63. The Reagan Administration eliminated outright the minimum benefits planned for
social security recipients and the CETA Jobs Training Program, and succeeded in cutting
federal funds and tightening eligibility criteria for a host of federal funds, including Medi-
care, Medicaid, AFDC, food stamps, unemployment benefit insurance, education, day care,
child protective services, services for the elderly and disabled, preventive health services, ma-
ternal and child health services, alcohol and drug treatment programs, community health
centers, low-income energy assistance subsidies, community development programs, anti-pov-
erty programs, and subsidized housing. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1981, at B6-7; July 29, 1981,
at 18, col. 1; Sept. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Feb. 1, 1983, at 17, col. 1.
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A less obvious administration effort is to reduce the effectiveness of
popular political demands which once made compensatory programs
necessary. In part this aim is being pursued through the ideological
campaign already described. The problems of urban residents and ur-
ban governments are being redefined so that they are no longer under-
stood as actionable through politics. The effort to blunt the political
pressures which generated the need for compensatory programs is not
only ideological; it is also programmatic. The Community Services Ad-
ministration, the legatee of the poverty program which was the center-
piece of the Great Society, has been eliminated, 64 and with it some of
the resources and legitimation yielded by that program to promote
claims on city government (as well as the federal government) by im-
poverished minority groups have disappeared. The attempt to elimi-
nate the Legal Services program, made with notable stridency and
determination, can similarly be understood as an effort not only to curb
the flow of resources to the victims, but also to reduce the political re-
sources ceded to the victims by the Democratic administrations of the
1960s. 65 Since these resources were typically directed to promoting de-
mands on city governments, this would also reduce pressures for local
expenditures.
Finally, the Reagan administration is attempting a structural shift in
the American polity that would, were it to succeed, partially restore the
vertical segmentation of business policies and popular policies that has
been undermined by twentieth century developments. The administra-
tion is attempting to decentralize significant social welfare programs.
The "New Federalism" proposal harkens back to the Nixon administra-
tion's revenue sharing proposals, launched with vaguely similar rhetoric
about "returning power to the people." Revenue sharing shifted au-
64. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2941-48 (1964), repealed by Pub. L.
No. 97-35, Title VI, 683(a), August 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 519.
65. The Legal Services Corporation, 42 U.S.C. § 2996, which was also created as part of
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, has withstood successive attempts by the Reagan
Administration in 1981, 1982, and 1983 to eliminate all funds appropriated to it by Congress.
N.Y. Times, July 29, 1981, at 18, col. 1.; Feb. 1, 1983, at 17, col. 1. After Congress rejected the
Administration's effort to abolish the Legal Services Corporation in 1981, President Reagan
appointed a president and a majority of directors to the Corporation's board. The new board
proceeded to adopt rules enabling the Corporation to "defund" certain programs and to en-
sure that Legal Aid lawyers assisted only the most destitute clients. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1983, at 4, col. 4. As part of Congress' concession to the Administration on the Legal Services
Corporation, the Corporation's budget was cut from $321 million in 1981 to $241 million in
1982 and 1983. In order to increase the budget of the Legal Services Corporation to $275
million in 1984, Congress added certain restrictions to the appropriations bill as an induce-
ment for President Reagan to sign, including curbs on lobbying by Legal Aid lawyers and
staff, curbs on filing class actions against state and federal governments, limits on assistance to
aliens, and procedural changes to make it more difficult for local legal services organizations
to renew their grants. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at 22, col. 3.; Nov. 29, 1983, at 25, col. 3.
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thority for the allocation of some federal expenditures to the states and
localities, although only a much watered-down version was imple-
mented by a balky Congress. 66
The Reagan administration appears more determined. It too was
partly thwarted in the first round of congressional action on its "block
grant" proposals, with the result that less federal authority was relin-
quished than the White House had proposed. But in 1982, the adminis-
tration tried again, in effect proposing that the AFDC and food stamp
programs be ceded to the states. The new proposals were dropped when
they provoked an uproar among state and local officials. It is instructive
to note they went much further toward decentralization then revenue
sharing or block grants, for the new proposals coupled a transfer of pro-
gram authority with a shift in revenue raising responsibility.
These decentralization proposals are attempts to implement struc-
tural changes. Like all structural changes, they would affect patterns of
political organization and influence, thereby improving the capacity of
some groups to make claims on the polity, and blunting the capacity of
other groups. Decentralization is an attempt to reverse the nationaliza-
tion of the politics of urban victims of economic change. It would ac-
complish this simply by fragmenting and displacing the national
organizations and constituencies which emerged in the last two decades,
forcing these political groups to scramble instead to try to influence de-
velopments in 50 states. At the same time, competition among groups
would intensify as they competed with each other for limited revenues
on the state level. 67
Options for responding to these demands at the state level are limited,
however. State governments only have feeble influence over patterns of
investment, but they are very vulnerable to investor influence. Investors
can and do bargain with state and local governments over desired poli-
cies and tax rates as the price for investing their money. This kind of
pressure might well result in sharp reductions in AFDC and foodstamp
benefits, which employers perceive as eroding work incentives and rais-
66. The shifts in the distribution of federal largesse associated with the shift from the
older federal grant-in-aid formulas to revenue sharing and block grants is examined in NA-
TIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF GENERAL REV-
ENUE SHARING (1976); See also David & Kantor, supra note 51; M. Levine, The Reagan Urban
Policy: Efficient National Economic Growth and Public Sector Minimization (paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1982)
(on file with the Yale Law & Poh'c Review).
67. See N.Y. Times, May 8,1983, at 18, col. 3, cithig R. NATHAN & F. DOOLITTLE, CONSE-
QUENCES OF CUTS (forthcoming 1984). The Nathan and Doolittle study examines the re-
sponses of 14 states to the Reagan budget cuts and concludes that the states made their own
cuts in the wake of the 1981 upheaval; that when restorations were made, they were often
inadequate; and that the character of the restoration was piecemeal rather than inclusive.
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ing taxes. Indeed, investor pressure, considered alone, might well drag
benefit levels and eligibility criteria down to the levels prevailing in the
lowest benefit and wage state, thus reversing an equalizing effect of fed-
eral social welfare programs on the states and localities evident since the
Depression.
Decentralization could have another familiar effect by increasing
fractionalism among the victims of national economic policy. The con-
siderable leverage of investors on state governments accounts in large
measure for a pattern of state taxation that is relatively regressive.6 A
pattern of regressive taxation, in turn, can be expected to heighten hos-
tility toward income support programs among the part of the popula-
tion that does not depend on the programs, but is made to pay for them.
Most important, were decentralization to succeed, the federal govern-
ment itself would be spared the pressures of increasingly competitive
politics among the populations hurt by disinvestment. Popular de-
mands would be deflected downward in the federal system, even though
national policies have become far more important than state and local
policies in generating patterns of economic investment. The Reagan ad-
ministration is not in fact proposing decentralization. It is merely trying
to restore the pattern which limits popular politics to localities.69
Will the political pressures generated by the victims of economic poli-
cies be blunted by these efforts? Merely to outline the potential effects
of the Reagan initiatives so baldly is to make such an outcome seem less
than credible. First, popular ideas, and the political expectations associ-
ated with those ideas, are not so easily transformed by the ideological
fulminations of a national leadership, particularly when those fulmina-
tions are contradicted by other leaders and when the ideological
message denies a good portion of contemporary experience, including
the experience of ordinary people. It will not be easy to persuade resi-
dents of big cities that the public expenditures on which they depend
must be reduced because they intrude upon the market, at a time when
a range of very large intrusions by the national government in the econ-
omy have become so visible. 70 The degree of federal government inter-
68. The major characteristics of the state and local tax system are its regressivity and
sluggish response to income growth. Fear of driving out commerce and industry and
discouraging the entry of new business restrains the use of most taxes; this is true particu-
larly of the individual income tax, which is the most equitable and most responsive to
growth.
J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 247 (1983).
69. See F.F. PIVEN AND R. CLOWARD, supra note 3, at 128-132.
70. Despite President Reagan's pledge to reduce government spending, federal expendi-
tures have continued to rise. For example, the federal budget for fiscal 1982, which called for
expenditures of $725.3 billion, was increased in 1983 by 4.5% to $757.6 billion. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 7, 1984, at 30, col. 3. This growth cannot be attributed solely to increased defense spend-
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vention in economic life has exposed the government, at least
symbolically, to popular accountability for ensuring a measure of eco-
nomic well-being. Debate over the extent of this accountability has
marked every national presidential campaign for the last fifty years, and
is surely one of the most striking features of contemporary American
electoral politics. 71
State and local leaders, of course, are not passive partners in the fed-
eral structure, and they are offering resistance to the new federal poli-
cies. After the first round of budget cuts in 1981, many of these officials
began to lobby actively against additional cuts which would further re-
duce their revenues. This opposition has had an impact on Congress,
where the Reagan administration has not been able to repeat its initial
budget cutting successes despite the enormous pressure exerted by loom-
ing deficits.7 2 State and city leaders responsible to urban constituencies
have not aligned themselves with the several efforts to mute local popu-
lar political demands. Perhaps in moments of serene contemplation, a
good number of them would prefer a return to an era of fewer claimants
and more limited claims. From the perspective of these local leaders,
however, there is no safe way to get from here to there. The Mayor of
Hartford, contemplating the Reagan program for the cities, sees cities
fighting states, and inner-city groups fighting city hall. "Meanwhile,
Reagan will be sitting at Camp David saying, 'Isn't it wonderful, our
national government is not interfering.' ",73 Local leaders understand
that groups now firmly integrated into city politics cannot easily be
ejected, and that claims now firmly acknowledged cannot be denied
without serious political penalty. State and local leaders are likely to
oppose a national crackdown on urban claims which, even if it were to
succeed in reducing some of the demands on municipal budgets in the
ing. For example, in 1983 the Reagan Administration spent a record $19 billion in the farm
price support program alone. Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1984, at A16, col. 1.
71. See E. TUFTE, POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY (1978) for an analysis of the
interaction of government policy, the economy and elections.
72. In 1983, Congress took action to halt any further reduction in spending for essential
social services, including food stamps, AFDC, child care and child nutrition programs, and
Medicaid for low-income families by cutting military expenditures. N.Y. Times, March, 24,
1983, at 26, col. 3. In addition, Congress appropriated monies to increase expenditures for
certain programs, educational aid for disadvantaged children, categorical grants, food supple-
ments, educational aid for handicapped students, and energy subsidies for low-income fami-
lies. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1983, at 1, col. 3; Sept. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Sept. 23, 1983, at 1, col.
1. In 1984, Congress again cut back on requested military expenditures for 1985 in order to
buttress social welfare programs. The extent of congressional support for most programs has
been limited to increases below the rate of inflation, however, with the exception of Social
Security and automatic benefit programs where increases were calculated to match both the
inflation rate and the expanding beneficiary pool. N.Y. Times, March 28, 1984 at 1, col. 3.
73. Quoted in Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1981, at 163.
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long run, will put them at the center of contending and indignant
groups in the short run.
In this curious way, the American federal structure, with its tangled
pattern of centralization and decentralization, may itself become an ob-
stacle to the current attempt to reduce claims on both federal and mu-
nicipal budgets. The Reagan policies, however, are really not oriented
to municipal fiscal strain and crisis. Rather, they reflect an attempt to
reverse the nationalization of popular politics, with which urban politics
and fiscal strain are intertwined. It is an attempt to restore the tradi-
tional pattern of federalism in which business politics was centralized
and popular politics decentralized. The effort is almost surely too little,
too late.
IV. Concluszon
Government policies were deeply implicated in the developments that
led to the emergence of the period of urban fiscal strain. These policies
were rooted in politics. The domestic policies of the Reagan administra-
tion, which will have a large impact on urban fiscal strain, are also
rooted in politics, albeit of a different kind. By denying the importance
of the role of willful human actors and focusing on the importance of
anonymous market processes the prevailing analysis does not reduce the
role of politics in urban development; rather, it merely reduces the
number of participants in the politics of urban development.
Furthermore, this article has argued that a distinctive kind of politics,
shaped by long-established structural features of the American polity,
muted conflict by proliferating concessions. Over time these structural
arrangements weakened, conflict escalated, and spread to national poli-
tics. The Reagan administration has responded by attempting to re-
store the structural arrangements which once contained popular politics.
If it succeeds, the arrangements which contributed to the illogical poli-
tics and policies of the past will be restored, and conflict will once again
be repressed, although fiscal strains will worsen. If the administration
fails, the issues of governmental economic and social policy issues which
should rightly be the object of national political contention should once
again emerge in national politics.
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